Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 51

Issue 1

Article 7

1985

Casenotes and Statute Notes
Barry Douglas Johnson

Recommended Citation
Barry Douglas Johnson, Casenotes and Statute Notes, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 243 (1985)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol51/iss1/7

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

EVIDENCE - EXPERT WITNESSES - 49 C.F.R. § 835,
which limits testimony by National Transportation Safety
Board employees, does not bar testimony of a former
Board employee where his testimony is unrelated to his
Board activities. Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines v. McDonnellDouglas, 158 Cal. App. 3d 83, 204 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1984).
On June 23, 1973, an aircraft owned and operated by
Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines (Loftleidir) crashed while on
its landing approach to John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York, 1 when the pilot prematurely extended the ground spoiler system. 2 The aircraft fell thirty
feet onto the runway. Although there were no deaths,
there were several injuries, 4 and there was extensive damage to the aircraft. 5 This action was brought in a California state court by Loftleidir against McDonnell-Douglas,
the manufacturer of the aircraft.6
At trial, Loftleidir asserted two theories for recovery,
strict liability and negligence. 7 The litigation centered
around the design of the aircraft's ground spoiler system.8
Loftleidir asserted that the design of the system permitted
early deployment and therefore caused the accident.9 In
Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines v. McDonnell-Douglas, 158 Cal. App. 3d 83, 204
Cal. Rptr. 358, 359 (1984).

2 Id. The ground spoiler system consists of ten hinged panels on the upper
surface of the wings. They are designed to enhance braking on the landing or
during an aborted takeoff of an aircraft and serve no in-flight function. Id. at n.1.
Id.

At the time of this appeal all of the actions for personal injury arising from
this accident had been resolved. Id. at n.2.
5 Id. at 359.
1Id.
7Id.

Id. at 359-60.
', Id. at 360. The DC-8 airplane involved in this accident was originally
equipped with what was known as a Mark I anti-skid system. Id. In the air, the

ground spoiler system could only be deployed by overcoming sixty-five to seventy
pounds of resistance from the deployment handle. Id. In 1962 the Mark I system
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support of this theory Loftleidir sought to introduce the
testimony of Mr. Charles 0. Miller,10 a former employee
of the Bureau of Aviation Safety."I The Bureau is the division of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
which investigates aircraft accidents.' 2 Mr. Miller was, at
time of trial, president and principal consultant of System
Safety Incorporated, and was qualified as an expert in the
area of human factors analysis.' 3 He was scheduled to testify regarding the human factor aspects of the design of
the ground spoiler system.' 4 McDonnell-Douglas filed a
motion in limine' 5 to exclude the testimony of Mr. Miller,' 6
alleging that a federal regulation limited the scope of permissible testimony of NTSB employees.' 7 The trial court
granted McDonnell-Douglas' motion."' Verdict was in
favor of McDonnell-Douglas on both the negligence and
was replaced with the Mark II system. Id. In-flight deployment was blocked by
thirty-five pounds of resistance. Id. At times, however, the in-flight deployment of
the ground spoilers required only nine pounds of pressure. Id. The Mark II System utilized an electronic actuator. If this actuator did not move to the "full retract" position, or if it received a spurious signal, the pilot would encounter only
nine pounds of resistance before the spoiler handle could be moved in-flight. Id.
10 Id.
I

I/d.

Id.
I Id. Human Factors Analysis, or Human Factors Engineering, applies information about human behavior to the design of products. Human Factors Analysis
encompasses the designing of products to match the capabilities of the users of
the products by considering the user, the product, and the environment in which
the product is used.
The primary purpose of Human Factors Analysis is to determine design features which may cause potential injury or involve anticipated misuse of a product.
The results can then be used to design a product which is safe for human use by
eliminating accidents that can cause extensive damage to products and equipment
or can seriously injure or kill people. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrry, § 71.05 (1983).
12

14

Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361.

11Id. A motion in limine is a motion presented either before or during trial to
foreclose testimony on certain prejudicial issues. The purpose of such a motion is
to avoid injection into trial of matters which are inadmissible or prejudicial. See
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (1963).
Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
The regulation is 49 C.F.R. § 835 (1975). For detailed discussion of the regulation and the pertinent test see infra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
,8 Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The court originally suggested that Mr.
Miller's tesitmony would be admitted provided that he made no reference to the
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strict liability issues.' 9 Loftleidir filed a motion for new

trial which was denied.2 ' Held, reversed: 49 C.F.R. § 835,
which limits testimony by National Transportation Safety
Board employees, does not bar testimony of a former
Board employee where his testimony is unrelated to his
Board activities. Lofileidir Icelandic Airlines v. McDonnellDouglas, 158 Cal. App. 3d 83, 204 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1984).
I.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938

In 1938, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act
(CAA). 2 ' The CAA sought to regulate all aspects of aircraft operation in the United States.22 Title VII of the
CAA created the Air Safety Board (Board) . 2' The duties
of the Board included making rules and regulations concerning aircraft accident investigation.2 4 The Board's primary responsibility was to investigate aircraft accidents
and to report to the Civil Aeronautics Authority the probable cause of such accidents.2 5 The sole purpose of the
Board's accident report was to prevent similar accidents
in the future by making recommendations to the Civil
26
Aeronautics Authority.
The CAA also provides in section 701(e) that the accident reports of the Board will be preserved and open for
opinions contained in the NTSB accident report. Id. at 360. But, one week into
the trial a hearing on the motion was held and the motion was granted. Id. at 361.
1 Id.

Id.
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 973 (1938) (repealed 1958)[hereinafter "CAA"]. /
2
The CAA, in addition to forming the Air Safety Board, also provided a comprehensive set of economic regulations involving licensing, carriage of mail, and
tariffs. See id Title IV.
20

21

'

Id. Title VII.

Id. § 702(a)(1).
Id. § 702(a)(2).
26 Id. § 702(a)(3). The statute reads: "It shall be the duty of the Board to. ...
make such recommendations to the Authority as, in its opinion, will tend to prevent similar accidents in the future ..
" Id. The Board is also authorized to act
on citizen complaints, and to conduct special studies to "reduce or eliminate the
possibility of, or recurrence of, accidents ..
" Id. § 702(a)(5).
24

2-1
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public inspection 2 7 and that "no part of any report or reports of the [Air Safety] Board or the [Civil Aeronautics]
Authority relating to any accident, or the investigation
thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit
or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports. '28 From the language of
the statute it is clear that the reports of the Board may not
be used as evidence in a civil action. 29 However, the statute does not address the question of testimony of Board
employees. 3 0 The scope of the testimonial privilege
granted in section 701(e) was left to the courts to define.'
Section 701(e) was first addressed by a court in Ritts v.
American OverseasAirlines. In Ritts, a witness (not a Board
employee) called by the Board to testify at an accident investigation was also called at trial to testify regarding the
same accident. 3 The defendant airline objected based on
section 701(e).3 4 The federal district court held that section 701 (e) was a bar only to admission of reports of the
Board. 5 The court, however, held that section 701(e) did
not bar the use of testimony by witnesses examined by the
Board.3 6 In reaching its conclusion the court relied heavily upon the policy beneath the prohibition:
The reason for the prohibition in respect to the use of "reports" of the Board most likely is based on the fact that
the report would contain findings and conclusions, the receipt of which at a trial might be prejudicial to a party who
had no part in the investigation of the Board and no opportunity to be heard by the Board. 7
Id. § 701 (e).

2

'8

Id.

See Simpson, Use of Aircraft Accident Investigation Information In Actions for Damages, 17J. AIR L. & CoM. 283 (1950).
29

3o CAA § 701 (e).
31 Id.
2

97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

3s Id. at 458.
34
35
36
37

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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In the context of Ritts, the court believed that the policy
behind section 701 (e) would not be defeated where a witness could be confronted in open court by representatives
of both sides of the lawsuit. 8 The court, therefore,
strictly construed section 701(e) as a ban only on the use
of the actual Board accident report.3 9
The strict construction of Ritts was subsequently
adopted by another federal district court in Tansey v.
Transcontinental& Western Air. 40 Here the defendant airline
refused production in discovery4 ' of an accident report
which it was required to file with the Board.42 The airline
contended that the report was privileged under section
701 (e). 43 After reviewing with approval the Ritts opinion,
the court discussed the conflicting policies behind section
701(e) and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 4 The
court noted that justice is promoted by full disclosure of
the facts available to both parties.45 As such, an exception
to the disclosure requirements of the rules of civil procedure would not be found unless supported by a clear expression in the statutory language. 46 The court held the
report admissible by strictly construing section 701(e)
noting that the section exempts from use only the "reports" of the Board and not those reports filed by the airline to the Board.4 7
38 Id.
39 Id.
10 97

F. Supp. 458 (D.C.C. 1949).
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that one party to an
action may serve upon another party a request to produce for inspection or duplication documents in the control of the other party. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
42 Tansey, 97 F. Supp. at 460. Section 702 of the CAA provides that "it shall be
the duty of the Board to make rules and regulations, governing notification and
report of accidents involving aircraft." CAA § 702. Pursuant to this duty the
Board passed a regulation which required a written report to be made of every
accident involving a certified aircraft. Tansey, 97 F. Supp at 460. The Tansey court
noted that "the form provided requires a 'detailed account of flight and accident,
including nature of difficulty, speed, altitude, maneuvers, etc.' " Id.
41 Tansey, 97 F. Supp. at 460.
4'

44
45

Id. at 461.
Id.

46 Id.
47

Id.
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In addition to adopting the reasoning of Ritts, the court,
in Tansey, relied on a wholly separate line of reasoning to
support its conclusion. Railroad companies are required
by law to submit accident reports similar to those at issue
in Tansey.48 These reports are specifically exempted from
use in related actions for damages. 49 The court believed
that the policy underlying this exemption was to encourage full and frank disclosure and investigation of accidents. 50 The court, however, believed that Congress did
not choose to grant such a broad exemption within the
CAA. 5 The court stated that "nothing has been found by
way of legislative history or by way of language of. . .[the
CAA] to compel this view as to the purpose of the statutes." 52 The court found, therefore, that the scope of section 701(e) is more limited than that of the railway
statutes, for if Congress had intended to encourage the
disclosure of information by making such reports privileged, it would have been a simple matter to refer to them
specifically as it did in the railroad reports statute. 53 Indeed, the court notes that Congress was quite explicit in
providing other privileges within the CAA such as in the
case of self-incrimination. 54 Congress' silence coupled
with the explicit provisions for evidence privileges within
48 Id. Federal law required that railroads make monthly reports of all accidents
resulting in death or injury to any person. 45 U.S.C. § 38 (1983). The Secretary
of Transportation has the authority to investigate all collisions, derailments or
other accidents resulting in serious injury to a person or to the property of a railroad. 45 U.S.C. § 40. Compare this with the requirement of the CAA set out in
note 43 supra.
19 The statute reads: "Neither the report nor.., any report of the investigation. . . nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in
said report or investigation." 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1985). Note here how remarkably
similar the language of section 41 is to that of section 701 (e) of the CAA. See supra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language of section
70 1(e).
50 Tansey, 97 F. Supp. at 461.

52

Id.

.5 Id. See Simpson, supra note 29, at 286 for a discussion of the relationship
between the ICC statute and the CAA statute.
.54See CAA, § 1004(i).

1985]

CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES

249

the CAA led the Tansey court to conclude that the scope of
section 701 (e) was much narrower than any similar exclusion in other transportation legislation.55 Accordingly,
the airline's report to the Board was held admissible.5 6
In Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines5 7 a court was
presented, for the first time, with the question of admissibility of testimony by Board employees. In Universal two
airplanes collided in mid-air.58 Among the issues before
the court of appeals 59 was the admissibility of testimony of
Mr. Berman, a Civil Aeronautics Board employee. 60 The
court held that section 701(e) excluded opinion and not
factual testimony. 6 '
On appeal, the Civil Aeronautics Board filed an amicus
curiae brief on the issue of Mr. Berman's testimony. 6 The
Board forwarded five policy reasons for support of the exclusion of Mr. Berman's testimony: 63 (1) The Board exists
solely for the purpose of gaining the information necessary to prevent similar accidents in the future; (2) Testimony in court discourages full and frank disclosure of
facts; (3) Conflicts between the investigators' findings and
the Board reports should not be revealed; (4) The Board
reports would usurp the functions of judge and jury by
taking from them the question to be litigated; and (5) The
Board could not support the administrative burden of
providing expert testimony for all air crashes investi-5 Tansey, 97 F. Supp. at 461.
56 Id.
17 188 F. 2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
51 Id. at 996. The mid-air collision was caused when two aircraft were flying on
the same general course. Id. The second plane was flying so fast that it eventually
overtook and collided with the first plane. Id. Under the rules of flight the second
plane must yield right of way to the first plane. Id.
-9 Other issues before the court included a tort action based on malicious interference with business which was dismissed because the statute of limitations had
expired. Id.
- Id. at 997.
6 Id., at 1000.
62 Id. at 995. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allow a party to appear
amicus curiae if that party can show that he has an interest in the outcome of the
litigation. FED. R. App. P. 29.

63

Universal, 188 F.2d at 998.
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gated.64 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that while all of these policy reasons were
sound, the exclusion of evidence must be considered with
regard to the ends of justice.6 5
The court of appeals noted that administrative agencies
have long been able to make reasonable regulations regarding their records, 66 and that courts have upheld administrative regulations forbidding agency employees
from testifying in suits between private parties. 67 Therefore the court asserted that it was well within the power of
the Board to limit its employees' ability to give live testimony at trial. 68
The court of appeals, however, was unwilling to find
that section 701(e) granted a total exclusion. 69 Balancing
the Board's interest in excluding testimony with the interest of the courts in a full and fair adjudication, the court of
appeals distinguished the factual testimony of Mr.
Berman from his testimony relating to the Board's opinions and conclusions. 70 The court held that the factual
testimony could be admitted, but excluded opinion and
conclusion
evidence on the basis of the enumerated policy
7
reasons.

1

Id.
65 Id.

66 Id. at 999. The court cites Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1899), where
the Supreme Court of the United States held that an agency may properly make
regulations concerning its records. Rules concerning the conduct of business and
the custody use and preservation of records are plainly valid as a means plainly
adapted to the end of the successful administration of an agency. This proposition was so clear in the eyes of the Court that the Court declared it to be manifestly true. Boske, 177 U.S. at 469.
67 Universal, 188 F.2d at 999. The court cites for support three cases upholding
a limitation on testimony by employees of the Internal Revenue Service. Id. See:
In re Lamberton, 124 F. 446 (W.D. Ark. 1903); Stegall v. Thurman, 175 F. 813
(N.D. Ga. 1910); United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Penn. 1936).
Universal, 188 F. 2d at 999.
69 Id.
70

Id.

71 Id.

This interpretation was subsequently adopted by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951). In
Lobel, an airliner crashed when its engines stopped. The Lobel court admitted a
Board investigator's report. The court noted that the report consisted wholly of
the investigator's personal observations about the condition of the plane after the
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While the court of appeals found statutory support for
its conclusion, it asserted an independent justification
based upon the rules of hearsay evidence.72 The court
noted that "the ultimate views or findings of the agency or
board are generally held inadmissible because they would
tend to usurp the functions of the jury. '7 3 By this the
court of appeals meant that some testimony by Board employees would violate the rules of evidence relating to
hearsay and opinion testimony. As the court of appeals
stated, "[s]uch reports, or testimony concerning such reports, would be hearsay based upon hearsay," and therefore inadmissible. 4 Accordingly, the testimony of Board
employees may be inadmissible regardless of the statutory
provision of section 701(e).
B.

The FederalAviation Act of 1958

In 1958 Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act
(FAA). 75 The provision regarding the admissibility of
Board accident reports (section 1441(e)) 76 is identical to
77
section 701(e) of the 1938 CAA.
In Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines,78 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals adopted the policy justifications for section
1441 (e) given section 701 (e) 79 in Universal. In Berguido, an
airliner crashed when the pilot attempted a "sneak-in"
landing where he deliberately flew below his authorized
accident. Furthermore, the report did not contain opinions or conclusions about
possible causes of the accident or defendant's negligence. Id. at 220.
72 Universal, 188 F.2d at 1000.
73 Id.
74

Id.

7 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
76 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1982).
Section 1441(e) reads: "No part of any report or
reports of the National Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident or

the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports." Id.
77 Id. For discussion of § 701 (e) of the CAA see supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
78
79

317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 631-62.
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glide slope.80 A Board employee was called as a witness
to testify regarding the glide scope of the airplane. 8 ' The
court held his testimony inadmissible stating that the policy beneath section 1441(e) involves a balancing of interests.82 On the one side there is the Board's interest in full
disclosure of the facts of the accident to prevent its reoccurence. 83 Secondly, there is a conflicting policy calling
for full disclosure of all the relevant facts to the litigants in
a lawsuit. 84 From these conflicting policies the court concluded that 1441 (e) excludes not only agency conclusions
but alsoopinion testimony of Board employees which reflects upon the Board's finding of probable cause of the
85
accident.
Berguido, therefore, stands for a much more limited privilege than that given by Universal. Under Universal all
opinion testimony by Board employees is excluded.86 In
Berguido only opinions relating to the Board's findings of
But as in
probable cause by the Board are excluded.
Universal, separate support for the court's holding was
found in the rules of evidence regarding hearsay testimony.88 The court noted that the vice of hearsay is especially apparent in the use of Board reports as evidence
because the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the employee and therefore determine the basis for
his conclusions.89
8o

Id. at 630-31.

81

Id. at 630.

82

83
8

Id. at 632.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 631-32.

-5 Id. at 632.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. In general, the rules of hearsay restrict the ability of a witness to testify as
to statements made by others out of court. See FED. R. EvID. 801-806.
89 317 F.2d at 632. Unlike Ritts (see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text)
the issue of hearsay testimony was directly presented. Id. The opinions held and
many of the facts found by an air crash investigator are based upon the reports of
other individuals to the NTSB official who seldom, if ever witnesses the accident.
As memorialized in the reports, these statements would be hearsay in that they
were made by persons not testifying at trial. See FED. R. EviD. 801(c). There is
some question as to whether the report falls within the hearsay exception for pub-
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Soon, a conflict developed among the courts in the application of Berguido's interpretation of section 1441 (e). In
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Frank9" the District Court of Connecticut distinguished between factual testimony and testimony based upon opinion and conclusions included in
the Air Safety Board's accident report.9 ' The court held
that section 1441 (e) excluded all evaluation, opinion, and
conclusion evidence. 2 However, purely factual testimony
is admissible. 3 The court justified this rule on the
Berguido opinion.9 4 Fidelity, therefore, established a "categorical" approach to the treatment of evidence under section 1441(e). As a question of law the judge must
categorize testimony by Board employees as either fact or
opinion. Opinion of any kind is excluded and facts are
admitted.
A similar question faced the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in American Airlines v. United States.95 The appeal in
American Airlines, as in Fidelity, centered around the scope
of permissible testimony of Board employees. 6 The
court of appeals in American Airlines, however, adopted a
more narrow privilege by focusing not on the category of
the testimony but on its substance.97 Relying on Berguido,
the court held certain opinion testimony admissible as
long as it does not embrace official agency opinion.98 The
court then noted the difficulty in classifying testimony as
fact or opinion under the Fidelity approach.99 The court
lic records of FED. R. EviD. 803(8). The question is whether the events described

within the report are "matters observed" within the meaning of the exception.
Certainly some aspects of the report fall within this exception (for example the
points of impact or the distribution of wreckage). Other items within the report
are not "matters observed" (for example the pre-crash performace of the aircraft).
- 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964).
91Id. at 949.
92

Id.

Id.
"Id.
,

9-, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).

Id. at 183.
Id.
98 Id. at 196.
-" Id. The court notes that it would be easy to classify the information concern97
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held that section 1441(e) "exclude[s] opinion testimony
only when it embraces the probable cause of the accident
or the negligence of the defendant."' 00 The court asserted that this "probable cause" test comes closer to the
policy behind the exclusion as forwarded in Berguido.t0 '
Therefore, courts approached section 1441(e) questions from two standpoints. Those following Fidelity used
the "categorical" approach and admitted only facts.
Other courts followed American Airlines and admitted all
testimony unless it related to the "probable cause" of the
accident.
Federal Regulation 835.
In 1975 the National Transportation Safety Board 0 2 responded to the confusion created by conflicting court decisions by proposing regulations defining the limits of
section 1441(e).' 0 3 Regulation 835 states that the Board
relies heavily upon the opinions of its investigators. 0 4 As
such, these opinions become "inextricably entwined" 0in5
the Board's final determination of probable cause.
Also the Board voiced a fear of the tremendous administrative burden which would accompany the demand for
C.

ing altitude, speed, and acceleration as being factual in nature under the Frank
rule. However, these "facts" disguise a very sophisticated mathematical extrapolation from the real facts. The danger here, then, is that these "manufactured
facts" with their opinion hidden by statistics will indirectly admit agency opinion.
Because of the difficulty in sorting pure fact from pure opinion the court believed
that opinion evidence should be excluded only when it embraces the probable
cause of the accident or the negligence of the defendant. Id.
too

Id.

10, Id.
102 In 1967 the Federal Aviation Act was amended by the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1659 (1983). This act brought the Federal Aviation Agency into the Department of Transporation. Id. § 1655(c). The new
Federal Aviation Administration maintains all of its safety regulations. Id. The act
also transferred to the Department of Transporation the safety functions of the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Id. § 1665(d). Within the Department of Transportation the accident investigation function was delegated to the National Transportation Safety Board. Id.
-3 49 C.F.R. § 835 (1975). The proposed regulation appears as Redesignation
and Revision of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (1975).
- 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(a) (1975).

105Id.
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opinion testimony by Board employees. 0 6 Therefore, the
resolution provides that Board employees "may testify as
to the factual information they obtained during the course
of the accident investigation.

. .

and they shall decline to

testify regarding matters beyond the scope of their investigation, or to give opinion testimony concerning the
cause of the accident."'' 0 7 Current Board employees may
not give live testimony at trial. 08 Testimony of former
board employees is subject to the same restriction except
that former employees may give live testimony. 0 9
When Regulation 835 was proposed, the Board stated
that only testimony that expressed the "ultimate determination of cause or probable cause determined by the
Board and expressed in the Board's report" should be
limited."10 The Board expressed its opinion that the regulation's "ultimate question" test was consistent with case
law to that point."' Specifically, the 2Board adopted the
American Airlines probable cause test."
106

Id.

107

Id.

0,

Id. § 835.5.

1- Id. § 835.7.

"o 40 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (1975).
-Id.
112 The Board relied on the case of Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va.
1972) for support. Redesignation and Revision of Regulations 40 Fed. Reg.
30,232 (1975) (codifed as 49 C.F.R. Ch. VIII (1984)). Kline has summarily
adopted the American Airlines rationale. Kline, 345 F. Supp. at 32. The Kline court
asserted that the American Airlines rule came closer to the policy which prompted
section 1441 (e), namely, "to guard against the introduction of C.A.B. reports expressing agency views about matters which are within the function of the court."
Id. (quoting Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1957)) See
supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American Airlines
rule.
The Board noted, however, that the new regulation may be construed to be
inconsistent with the decision of Faulk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113 (D. Conn.
1971). 40 Fed. Reg. at 30,232. In Faulk a board employee was compelled to answer certain questions in deposition regarding his opinion of the cause of an accident. 53 F.R.D. at 114. The court in Faulk distinguished between testimony in
deposition and testimony in trial. Id. Testimony in deposition is not entered into
the record and therefore the policy supporting exclusion would not be offended.
Id. The court, therefore, compelled the Board employee to testify in deposition.
Id. In the remarks accompanying the proposed regulation the Board asserted its
belief that the rationale of Faulk was clearly in error. 40 Fed. Reg. at 30,232.
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Federal Regulation 835 was first addressed by a court in
Beech Aircraft v. Harvey." 3 The case arose from the crash
on take-off of a small airplane. ' 4 Litigation centered
around the design of the wing." 5 A Board employee was
asked at trial to state why the wing had separated from the7
aircraft."1 6 Here, after an extensive analysis of the law,"
the court noted that section 835 adopted the "ultimate
question" test."" The Supreme Court of Alaska applied
Regulation 835 and held that the cause of the wing's separation was the ultimate question to be decided by the jury
and therefore the Board
employee's testimony should
9
have been excluded."1
In Murphy v. ColoradoAviation the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted section 835 very broadly.' 20 In a negligence action a Board employee testified that weather
conditions would have required the pilot of the crashed
plane to use instruments to navigate.' 2 ' He also testified
that the pilot was not instrument certified. 22 The court
held that such testimony was not barred by section 835.123
Even though the testimony strongly implied a conclusion
of negligence, the court believed that the testimony "did
not state that this accident was caused by the negligence
of the pilot.' ' 2 4 The "ultimate question" to be determined by the jury was narrowly drawn by the court of appeals as the actual negligence of the pilot.' 2 5 The Board
employee's testimony did not take this ultimate question
113 558

P.2d 879 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 880.
115Id. at 880-81.
,-6 Id. at 881.
117 Id.
' Id. at 882-83. The ultimate question test prohibits a Board employee from
testifying as to the ultimate question to be decided by the jury. See supra notes
103-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ultimate question test.
ld. at 882-83.
I9
12o 588 P.2d 877 (Colo. App. 1978).
121 Id. at 881.
122 Id.
12" Id. at 882.
124 Id.
114

125

Id.
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from the jury.' 26 The jury was27still free to draw its own
conclusion from the evidence.
Carlson v. Piper Aircraft 28 presented a section 835 problem in a unique context. Carlson was a wrongful death action brought following the mid-air break-up of a small
airplane. 29 A Board employee was called as a witness to
testify regarding the Board investigation.13 0 At trial, however, he was asked certain questions, as an expert, regarding the effects of pilot overcontrol.' 3 1 Carlson, the
deceased pilot's spouse, objected and sought reversal on
appeal of the trial court's exclusion of the Board employee's testimony. 32 The Oregon Court of Appeals
noted that the Board employee was independently qualified as an expert to testify on issues relating to pilot control. 33 In holding the testimony admissible,, the court
found that the testimony did not touch on the ultimate
question (the structural safety of the aircraft) but instead
related to his independent area of expertise. 34
Courts, therefore, have developed a very narrow privilege under regulation 835. As a matter of law, the court
must decide if the evidence offered touches on the ultimate question to be litigated. No definition of the "ultimate question" was given within the Regulation. Courts,
however, have construed this phrase rather narrowly. Recall Carlson, where the trial concerned the issue of pilot
negligence. The court of appeals asserted that for section
835 evidence purposes the question was the actual
negligence.
126
'le7
128

"1

Id.
Id.
57 Or. App. 695, 646 P.2d 43 (1982).

Id. at 44.

-o Id. at 48.
'13' Id.
132
133

134

at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
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LOFTLEIDIR ICELANDiC AIR V. MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS

At trial Loftleidir sought to introduce the testimony of
Charles 0. Miller. 35 Mr. Miller was at the time of the accident an employee of the NTSB.136 However, at the time
of trial he was president of System Safety Incorporated,
an independent engineering firm. 137 McDonnell-Douglas
sought to exclude this testimony based on Regulation
835.138

The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling on the motion in limine which had excluded
the testimony of Mr. Miller.' 39 The precise reason for
granting the motion was unclear in the trial court's record.' 40 The California Court of Appeals, however, noted
that there are three independent reasons which could
have supported the trial court's ruling: (1) Miller was prohibited from testifying under section 835.5 (testimony of
Board employees);' 4 ' (2) Miller was prohibited under section 835.3 (testimony of former Board employees); 142 or
(3) Miller was prohibited because of alleged inconsistencies between his contemplated testimony and the opinions and conclusions contained in the final NTSB
report. "4s The court summarily rejected this third reason.' 4 4 The court then rejected section 835.5 as a basis
for exclusion. This section forbids live testimony at trial
135Loftleidir, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 83, 204 Cal Rptr. at 361.
136 Id.
137Id.
138

Id.

Id. at 364-66.
Id. at 361.
141 Id.
142 Id.
"

140

143

Id.

Id. at 364. The court asserts that McDonnell-Douglas cited various passages
of the transcript out of context. Id. at 361. McDonnell-Douglas asserted that the
testimony should be excluded under California Evidence Code § 352 which cloaks
the court with discretionary power to exclude testimony if its admission would be
time consuming or cause undue prejudice or confusion. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(West 1985). The Loftleidir court reviewed the entire record and concluded that
the sole ground for exclusion was Regulation 835. Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361144

64.
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by current Board employees. 145 After quoting the provision the court asserted that this section applied only to
current Board employees. 46
The bulk of the court's analysis dealt with section 835.7
and the testimony of former Board employees. Section
835.7 states:
It is not necessary to request Board approval for testimony
of a former Board employee. However, the scope of testimony of former Board employees is limited to the matters
delineated in section 835.3 [the ultimate question prohibi47
tion] and use of reports as prescribed in section 835.4.1
Given this regulatory provision, two issues were before
the court regarding Mr. Miller's testimony at the trial.',4 8
First, the court had to decide whether a former employee
was allowed to give live testimony at trial' 49 (as opposed
to deposition testimony and written interrogatories). Second, the court had to decide whether Mr. Miller's testimony at trial (if allowed) would exceed the scope of
allowable testimony defined by the regulation.5 0
In regard to the first issue, the ability of former employees to testify, the court notes that the regulation
adopts by reference the provisions of section 835.3 (the
ultimate question prohibition) and section 835.4 (the use
of Board reports)' 5 ' but not the provisions of section
835.5 152 which prohibit live testimony at trial.15 3 The
court reasoned that section 835.5 was designed to circumvent the tremendous administrative burden accompanying the constant need to have Board employees appear at
14-149 C.F.R. § 835.5. Section 835.3 further restricts testimony on the ultimate
cause of the accident. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
14,;Loftlidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
,4749 C.F.R. § 835.7.
14- Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
''
Id.
150 Id.
'151

15

Id.
See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of section

835.5.
,-,, Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
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trial.'5 4 This justification resembles that given by the
Board when the regulation was proposed.155 In the case
of former Board employees the court found that there was
no such burden. 56 Therefore, a former Board employee
could give live testimony at the trial without circumventing the policies of section 835.5.
Having concluded that former Board employees may
testify, the court turned to the second issue, the allowable
scope of Mr. Miller's testimony. 5 7 This scope is defined
by section 835.3.58 The court stated that this section is
designed primarily to exclude opinions reflecting official
Board positions. 5 9 The court noted that section 835.3
excludes from introduction only opinion testimony relating to the probable cause of the accident. 60 The Loftleidir
court concludes that courts have consistently held that
section 835.3 prohibits only Board employees from rendering opinions concerning the NTSB's finding on the
6
probable cause of an accident.' '
The California Court of Appeals then noted that Mr.
Miller's testimony was not so "inextricably entwined" in
the opinions of the NTSB as to require exclusion. 62 The
court stated that Mr. Miller's actual involvement in the investigation of this accident was minimal, 63 and that his
opinions concerning the human factors aspect of the
ground spoiler system were formed only after he left the
NTSB and conducted his own private investigation for
ld. at n. 5.
See infra notes 102-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the regulation's proposal.
1- Loftleidir's attorney suggested that § 835.5 was designed to protect current
employees from the constant need to appear at trial. Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
361 n.5.
157 Id. at 362.
'I
1.

'"
159

See supra note 103-107 and accompanying text.
Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 362.

-, Id. The court cited without discussion the following cases: Carlson v. Piper
Aircraft, 57 Or. App. 695, 646 P.2d 43 (1982); Kline v. Martin 345 F. Supp. 31
(D.C. Va. 1972); Keen v. Detroit Diesel-Allison, 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978).
w, Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
62 Id. at 363.
1-'

Id.
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Loftleidir. 164 The court, therefore, concluded that section
835.3 provides an inadequate basis for 65
the exclusion of an
independent investigator's testimony. 1
The Loftleidir court, however, went one step further.
The court noted that Mr. Miller was not being called as an
NTSB expert; rather, he was retained as an independent
expert to testify regarding the safety of the ground spoiler
system from a human factor standpoint.166 The policy underlying section 835 is to prevent disclosure of the "deliberative process" of an NTSB investigation and thereby
16 7
not remove from the jury the finding of probable cause.
This policy would not be frustrated by a former NTSB
employee's testimony regarding an independent investigation involving an independent area of expertise. 6 . As
such, the Loftleidir court found that "Miller's proposed testimony was unrelated to his tenure with the NTSB and
was also outside the purview of section 835."169
III.

CONCLUSION

The Lofileidir court did not break With precedent. The
decision is notable, however, in several respects. First,
the decision reaffirms the overriding importance of'the
American Airlines170 decision as the basis for interpretation
of Regulation 835. The American Airlines "probable cause"
view was by far the majority position before Regulation
835.17 1 And American Airlines, remember, served as the
primary basis for Regulation 835.172 American Airlines distinguished between testimony relating to agency opinion
Id.
-5 Id.

164

Id.

66

Id. at 364. This statement is well supported by the policy forwarded by the

1,17

Board when Section 835 was proposed. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying
text.
Ic Id.
*

""'
17o

''

Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (emphasis supplied).

418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1964).
See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ameri-

can Airlines rule.
172 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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173
and testimony relating to facts and other opinion.
Agency opinion may be admitted as long as it does not
touch upon the probable cause of the accident. Loftleidir
explicitly adopts the American Airlines view and is entirely
consistent with it. Mr. Miller's testimony does not qualify
as agency opinion. Therefore, as independent opinion,
his testimony should be admitted.
The Loftleider court broke new ground concerning testimony by former NTSB employees qualified as independent experts. The Loftleider court relied on Carlson1 74 which
allowed an NTSB employee to give opinion testimony regarding his independent area of expertise, pilot overcontrol. 7 5 In Loftleidir the questioned testimony regarded
Mr. Miller's independent area of expertise - human factors analysis. Yet, Loftleidir justifies introduction of the
testimony on entirely different grounds than Carlson. Carlson used Regulation 835 to justify the testimony.' 76 Loft/eider, on the other hand, clearly states that testimony
based on a former NTSB employee's independent area of
expertise is "outside the purview"'' 7 7 of section 835. As
such, the testimony is limited only by the rules of evidence 78 such as the hearsay exception.
Under Loftleider a court, faced with a section 835 question, first determines if the proposed testimony relates to
the "deliberative proceedings" of the NTSB. If not, section 835 does not matter and the testimony is limited only
by the rules of evidence.' 79 If the proposed testimony did
relate to the "deliberative process" of the NTSB, a court
would then use the section 835 "ultimate question" test

173
174
175

176
177
179

See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
Carlson, 57 Or. App. 695, 648 P.2d 43.
Id.
Id.
Loftleidir, 104 Cal. Rptr. 358, 364.
See supra note 89 for a discussion of the hearsay rule.

179 The rules of evidence will provide an independent justification for the exclusion of testimony. For example, the fact that the profferd evidence (the Board
Report) is admissable under Section 835 has no bearing on the characterization of
the report as hearsay.
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to determine admissibility of opinion evidence. 8 0 In addition, the rules of hearsay would be applied to test admissibility.' 8 ' Contrast this approach to that in Carlson,
where all testimony, whether it relates to the deliberative
proceedings of the Board or not, is tested for admissibility
under the "ultimate question" test of section 835.
Loftleidir, in the final analysis, seems to be entirely consistent with the case law as developed. The Loftleidir court
continued to limit the privilege granted in the Federal
Aviation Act and Regulation 835. Considering the policy
beneath the regulation and the position Mr. Miller occupied, the logic of the decision is apparent. First, the testimony of a former employee imposes no administrative
burden on the NTSB. Second, Mr. Miller's testimony was
wholly unrelated to the NTSB investigation therefore
there was little danger that the issue of negligence or design defect would be "taken" from the jury. Third, the
probative effect of having a former NTSB employee testify
as to matters unrelated to his NTSB activities is slight.
There is, in other words, little danger that the jury will be
so awed by Mr. Miller's current status as to decide the issue of negligence solely on his testimony. 8 2 In sum, none
of the policies forwarded to exclude NTSB accident reports can be used to support exclusion of a former employee's testimony in an area of independent expertise.
Barry DouglasJohnson

,,0 Factual evidence is still clearly admissable. Lofileider, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
Recall from American Airlines that one of the objections to the Fidelity approach of
fact versus opinion is the inherent difficulty of classifying a piece of testimony as
fact or opinion. American Airlines, 418 F.2d 480. Regardless of the test in American
Airlines or Section 835, the difficulty remains in classifying testimony as fact or
agency opinion. This distinction remains unclear.
18, Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 364. See supra note 180 for a discussion of the
relationship of the hearsay rules to the application of section 835.
182 This is especially true in light of the fact that Loftleidir's counsel was willing
to have Mr. Miller testify without reference to his former affiliation with the
NTSB. Id.
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